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Case No. 20020879-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ft & & 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit plain error in giving a reasonable doubt jury 
instruction that comports with the most recent opinion of the Utah Supreme Court? 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (1) an error exists; (2) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. 
1 
Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) (applying plain error test to unpreserved 
challenge to jury instruction). 
2. Has defendant shown that his trial counsel was ineffective where counsel 
generally performed competently and defendant has not shown prejudice? 
In ruling on an ineffective assistance claim following a Rule 23B hearing, 'we defer 
to the trial court's findings of fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness.'" State 
v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 289 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted), cert denied, 982 P.2d 
88 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Fourth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2004); 
Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (R.3). A jury convicted defendant 
of the crime charged (R. 165-166; 254:126-27). Defendant filed a motion to arrest the 
judgment (R. 180-81). After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R.242; 255:3-6. 
The court sentenced defendant to a statutory five-to-life prison term, to be served 
concurrently with a federal sentence (R.227-29). Defendant timely appealed (R.244-45). 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court (R.251). 
2 
Defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(court of appeals case file).1 This Court remanded as to some, but not all, of defendant's 
claimed instances of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness (R.266-67). Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.470-75). The trial 
court concluded that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate alibi 
witnesses (id.). The trial court concluded, however, that defendant was not prejudiced by his 
other claims of ineffectiveness (id.). 
Defendant claimed on appeal that, among other errors, the trial court erred in 
submitting a defective reasonable doubt instruction to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 23-30 
This Court stayed the briefing schedule until the Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Reyes, 
2005 UT33, 527 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, which was on certiorari review. On June 21,2005, this 
Court lifted the stay and ordered the State to file its responsive brief by July 21, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Sometime between 6:30 p.m. and 6:40 p.m. on December 5, 2001, John Nieser, a 
truck driver, was at Freeway Transmission, 847 West 1700 South in Salt Lake City, when a 
man approached him within two feet, stuck a gun to his face, and said, "Give me your wallet 
or else" (R.253:2-3, 9, 14; 254: 12, 15). After Nieser gave the man his wallet and the $773 
1
 The grounds alleged in support of the motion, the Court's remand order, evidence 
presented at the hearing, and the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
specifically discussed in the fact statement and argument sections of the brief. 
2
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. 
See State v. Temyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997). 
3 
or $774 it contained, the man ordered Nieser to get back into his truck and not to follow him 
(R.254-.17-18). The manthenran away eastbound on 1700 South (R.253:4; 254:18,36). The 
encounter lasted for about four or five minutes (R.254:19, 33). Although the area was not 
well-lit, there was sufficient light from a street lamp across the street for Nieser to see the 
robber (R.253:8; 254:46-47). 
Nieser remained in his truck for five or ten minutes to slow down his heart rate before 
calling the police (R.253:5, 8; 254:19-20, 33). He described his assailant as "a little 
Hispanic," male about twenty years old with a goatee, unshaven that day, about 57" or 5f8" 
tall between 130 and 160 pounds, wearing black baggy pants, a blue shirt with writing across 
the front, and white athletic shoes (R. 253:5, 9, 12,20-22,25; 254:21-23, 38-39,43,47, 52-
53).3 The gun had silver on it (R.253:3; 254:16). 
Salt Lake County Officers Richard Brede and Kouris Mclnnes were nearby when they 
heard dispatch, at about 6:39 p.m., report the robbery and that the suspect was last reported 
fleeing south (R.253:15-16; 254:50-51, 54). They drove to the Flying J truck stop, located 
at 900 West and 2100 South—about a quarter-mile from the crime scene—because it was in 
the direction of defendant's reported flight and open twenty-four hours (R.253:16, 25; 
254:54-55). 
The officers found defendant, who matched the description of the robbery suspect, in 
an upstairs trucker's lounge of the Flying J—a male in his twenties with facial hair, wearing 
3Around the time defendant was arrested, he stood 5f4" tall and weighed 145 
pounds (R. 14; R.54:75). 
4 
dark baggy jeans, a blue sweatshirt or pullover with a hood, and white athletic shoes 
(R.253:17, 25; 254:52-56, 67).4 
The officers approached defendant and asked if they could speak with him 
(R.253:17;254:56). Defendant agreed to talk, and they moved into an adjacent area 
(R.253:17; 254:56). When the officers explained that defendant matched the description of 
a suspect in a crime that had recently occurred in the area, defendant told them that he was 
waiting for a Western Union telegram (R.253:18). 
The officers then asked defendant whether he had a weapon (R.253:18; 254:56). 
When defendant said that he did not, Officer Mclnnes asked whether defendant minded if 
the officers frisked him, since the crime they were investigating involved a gun (R.253:18; 
254:56-57). Defendant then admitted that he had a gun and told the officers that it was in the 
waistband of his pants on the left hand side (R.253:18; 254:57). The officers handcuffed 
defendant and removed the gun (R.253:18; 254:57). The gun was a Ruger P89 9-millimeter 
semiautomatic handgun with a silver slide. The gun was loaded—four rounds in the 
magazine with a round in the firing chamber (R.253:19; 254:57-58). Defendant told the 
officers he bought the gun from a truck driver whom he did not know, but who had recently 
given him a ride (R.253:19; 254:59). Officer Brede checked defendant's pulse and found it 
toberapid(R.254:62). 
4
 Officer Brede variously testified that defendant appeared Hispanic and 
Caucasian (R.253:22; 254:55, 66-67). 
5 
Defendant was taken into custody and searched. Neither Nieser's wallet nor his 
money were found on defendant's person, in his belongings, or in the immediate vicinity 
(R.253:23, 25; 254:77-78). A quick search from the police car of the path one might take 
from Freeway Transmission to the Flying J also did not produce Neiser's wallet or money 
(R.254:80). 
Because defendant had said that he had been in the truck stop for several hours and 
identified people at the Flying J who would confirm that, Officers Brede and Mclnnes, joined 
later by another officer, returned to the lounge to speak with other witnesses (R.253:19, 24; 
254:71, 93). The officers spoke to Paul Ardis at 7:16 p.m. (R.253:24-25). He said that he 
had seen defendant at the Flying J about two hours earlier and again about twenty minutes 
earlier (id.). None of the people identified, including Mr. Ardis, could confirm that 
defendant was at the Flying J at the time of the robbery (R.253:24-25,29; 254:79-82,93-94). 
After taking defendant into custody, Officers Brede and Mclnnes contacted detective 
Jon Wallace, who was with the victim at the scene of the crime, and reported that they had 
a suspect (R.254:62, 90). Detective Wallace told Nieser that the officers had a possible 
suspect and wanted to see if Nieser could identify him (R.253:5; 254:24,43,89-90). Wallace 
drove Nieser to the Flying J (R.254:24,90). Defendant was outside when Detective Wallace 
and Nieser arrived (R.254:90). Detective Wallace parked his car in front of defendant and 
turned his lights on to illuminate defendant (R.253:6; 254: 24, 39, 90). Nieser, who was 
sitting in the back seat of the police vehicle, was between thirty and thirty-seven feet from 
defendant (R.253:6; 254:24-25, 40, 90). Wallace instructed Nieser to take his time, to look 
6 
at all of defendant's features, and to indicate whether he could positively identify defendant 
as the robber (R.254:91). 
Nieser first asked Detective Wallace to turn down the lights because they were too 
bright (R.254:41). He told Wallace he recognized defendant—Hispanic, with "scraggly 
facial hair,5' the height and weight he had described, wearing black baggy pants and white 
tennis shoes, but that defendant was wearing a different shirt (R.253:7; 254:25-26,29, 91). 
Having been told that defendant was wearing multiple shirts, Detective Wallace asked the 
officers near defendant to lift up each of defendant's shirts, one at a time, so that Nieser 
could see them (R.253:7; R.254:26,91; St. Ex.3). After two of defendant's shirts were lifted, 
Nieser identified the third shirt as the one the robber had worn (R.253:7,10; 254:26,28,92; 
St. Ex. 3). Nieser then positively identified defendant as the robber (R.253:7; 254:29, 41, 
92). 
After Nieser identified defendant as the robber, defendant was interviewed by Officer 
Michelle Ross (R.253:26-27; 254:84-85). She gave defendant his Miranda rights, and he 
agreed to waive those rights and to speak with her (R.253:27;254:85). Defendant told 
Officer Ross that he was from out of town and, after unsuccessfully trying to locate a friend 
in Sugarhouse, had met a truck driver on 1-80 who had taken him to the Flying J (R.253:28; 
254:85). Defendant said that the truck driver had given him a gun to protect himself 
(R.253:28-29; 254:86). Defendant denied committing any robbery (R.253:29). 
Neiser identified defendant as the robber at trial (R.254:30). Nieser recalled that 
defendant wore the same smirk depicted in a photograph taken the night of the arrest as he 
7 
wore during the robbery (R.254:28-29; State's Ex.3). Nieser also identified defendant's gun 
as the gun used in the robbery (R.254:16-17, 35; State's Ex. 2). 
The defense rested at the close of the State's case-in-chief (R.254:98). 
After sentencing, defendant moved this Court to temporarily remand pursuant to rule 
23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, for a hearing on his trial counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness. This Court granted defendant's motion , in part, with the following order: 
Defendant has alleged sufficient facts not appearing in the record 
for a remand as to whether trial counsel was ineffective for (1) 
offering defendant's wallet as evidence at trial, (2) not investigating 
witnesses Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla, and (3) not 
filing a pretrial motion in limine to exclude Defendant's prior 
strong-arm robbery conviction. However, Defendant has not 
alleged sufficient facts not appearing in the record for a remand as 
to whether trial counsel was ineffective for not producing evidence 
that Margaret Puebla wired money to Defendant, not moving for a 
new trial, and not filing motions to suppress the gun, Defendant's 
statements to the officers, and the victim's identification of 
Defendant. 
(R.266-67, "Order," Addendum B). This Court directed the trial court to make specific 
findings of fact concerning those issues on which the motion was granted (id). After a 
hearing, the trial court made the requested findings, discussed below (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on 23B Remand, "Findings," R.470-75, Addendum C; 478:1-140). The 
testimony of witnesses bearing on defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
the trial court's findings of fact are discussed in the argument portion of this brief. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - The trial court did not plainly err in submitting a reasonable doubt instruction 
that omitted the phrase, "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt," and that 
included the phrase, "reasonable doubt is not doubt which is merely possible." During the 
pendency of this appeal, State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, issued. There, the supreme court 
upheld a jury instruction using the same language as the challenged instruction in this case. 
POINT II - Defendant's various claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel fail, first because in only one instance did his counsel perform deficiently, and 
second, because evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial. 
Specifically, defense counsel was not deficient in not moving to suppress the 
eyewitness identification and defendant's statements and the gun because those motions 
would have been futile. The eyewitness identification amply met the requirements set out 
in State v. Ramirez, and was superior in every particular to the identification in that case. 
Additionally, defendant's statements to the police and the discovery of the gun flowed from 
a consensual encounter. Even if the encounter were not consensual, the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for questioning and to frisk him because he 
substantially matched the victim's description of the robber and he was located close in time 
and place to the robbery. 
Counsel also timely and effectively moved to suppress evidence of defendant's prior 
conviction for a strong-arm robbery. The law is well-established that given the vagaries of 
trial, a motion to exclude convictions to impeach a defendant is properly reserved until the 
9 
time of trial. In any event, defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to successfully exclude the prior conviction—which allegedly led him not to take the 
stand—because defendant did not testify. 
Counsel was not deficient in failing to investigate witnesses who might have provided 
defendant with a stronger defense because defendant failed to sufficiently identify the crucial 
witness before trial. Additionally, absence of the witnesses' testimony did not prejudice 
defendant because the time frame established by their testimony did not preclude defendants 
commission of the robbery. Any error was harmless because evidence of guilt, based on a 
creditable eyewitness identification, the presence of additional incriminating evidence, and 
defendant's suspicious conduct, was substantial. 
Counsel was admittedly negligent in allowing defendant's wallet, which contained 
evidence that suggested he was on parole, to go to the jury. However, not only was evidence 
of defendant's guilt substantial, but only a single juror indicated that a business card found 
in the wallet indicated that defendant was on parole. On facts of similar consequence, the 
court in State v. Bruce found the evidentiary error harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURY WAS ADEQUATE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error in submitting a reasonable 
doubt jury instruction that failed to meet the requirements set out in State v. Robertson, 932 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other ground by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 25 n. 
10 
11,61 P.3d 1000, and which were upheld by this Court in State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 
84P.3d841. ApltBr. at 26-27. 
In Robertson, the court set out certain requirements and restrictions applicable to 
reasonable doubt jury instructions: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all 
reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should not state that a reasonable doubt is one 
which "would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. Third, "it is inappropriate 
to instruct that a reasonable doubt is nor merely a possibility," although it is permissible to 
instruct that a "fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt." 
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations omitted). 
Defendant claims that jury instruction 14 (R. 13 8, Addendum D) was plainly erroneous 
"because the instruction did not contain the essential phrase 'proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt obviates all reasonable doubt,' and did contain the impermissible language indicating 
that reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible." Aplt Br. at 26-27 (quoting Reyes, 
2004 Ut App 8, K 11, which cited Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, generally).5 Thus, defendant 
claims his right not to be convicted of a crime, except upon a finding of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, was violated under the Utah and United States constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 
24. 
In State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court put defendant's claim to rest. 
Taking Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) as its guiding light, the Reyes court first noted 
5
 "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) an error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.. . . ' " State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15, 95 P.3d 276 (citations omitted). 
11 
that the United States Supreme Court "ha[d] . . . elected to sanction great flexibility in the 
manner in which the concept of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' is communicated to juries": 
So long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt... the Constitution does not require that any 
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden 
of proof. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33 % 13 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 5). The Reyes court concluded that 
because "'the obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test carries with it the 
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we expressly abandon it." Id. at j^ 30. With regard to Robertson's 
proscription against the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot be a mere possibility," the court 
recognized the limitation of "mere possibility," standing alone, to accurately limit the scope 
of reasonable doubt. Id at fflf 31-32. The court concluded, however, that when doubt that 
was "merely possible" was "followed by the explanatory phrase,' since everything in human 
affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt,'" the combined statement satisfactorily 
"neutralize^] the risk that. . . a juror [might] apply a standard of proof lesser than beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Id. at j^ 33.6 
6Any argument by defendant that iteyes does not speak to his attack under the Utah 
Constitution would be unavailing. Although the Reyes court restricted its inquiry to the 
federal constitution, the court observed that such limitation was "of little consequence 
here, inasmuch as none of our decisions that address that 'beyond a reasonable doubt' 
standard have turned on an interpretation of the Utah Constitution." Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
j[19. The court further stated that "[i]mplicit in our 'beyond a reasonable doubt' cases,. . 
. is the understanding that they are to be properly measured against the standards 
established by the Supreme Court." Id. 
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Here, jury instruction 14 contains the same alleged deficiencies approved in Reyes. 
That is, the instruction did not specifically state that the State's proof "obviate all reasonable 
doubt (R.138). It also states that "[Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely 
possible, since everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt" 
(id). Thus, under Reyes, the challenged instruction is plainly not erroneous.7 
POINT II - DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY; EVEN IF COUNSEL HAD 
PERFORMED INADEQUATELY, DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED 
BECAUSE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT WAS SUBSTANTIAL 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in 
several ways. Aplt. Br. at 30-50. Generally, defendant's claims fail because he has not 
demonstrated that his trial counsel performed deficiently. Defendant's ultimate claim of 
ineffective assistance fails because evidence of defendant's guilt, based on a credible 
eyewitness identification, the presence of additional incriminating evidence, and defendant's 
suspicious conduct, was substantial. Defendant therefore has not shown prejudice. 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show both 
that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
7
 Defendant argues in the alternative that his counsel was ineffective in allowing 
jury instruction 14 to be submitted to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 27-29. However, because the 
instruction was adequate, counsel was not deficient in not objecting to it. See State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,1J26, 1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.") 
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him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see also Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
A, Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be deferential. 
"The benchmark forjudging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. However, 
"[jjudicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential."/d. at 689. "It is 
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or 
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has 
proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable." Id. Consequently, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's 
perspective at the time." Id. 
In assessing whether trial counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable profession judgment," Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50, a 
reviewing court "must keep in mind 'the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel 
[and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal 
defendant.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689 (1984)); see also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 R.2d 516, 521(Utah 1994). Because courts 
"give trial counsel wide altitude in making tactical decision," they "will not question such 
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decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 
638, 644 (Utah 1996) (quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277,282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis 
added). Thus, to succeed on a clam that trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant must 
"rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1fl9, 12 P.3d 92 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 
1994). 
Importantly, defend ant must show that counsel's performance "'fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, '"State v. Perry, 899P.2d 1232,1239 (Utah App. 1995) 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (emphasis added), based on "the facts of the particular 
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Thus, the 
issue is not whether counsel "had a specific strategy in mind," but, rather, whether "a rational 
basis for counsel's performance can be articulated." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247 f 22, 9 P.3d 777 (same). 
B. Motions to suppress the eyewitness identification, the gun, 
and defendant's statements would have been futile. 
"[F]ailure of counsel to make motion or objections which would be futile if raised 
does not constitute ineffective assistance . . ." State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah 
App. 1998) (discussing deficient performance) (citations omitted). 
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1. Suppression of eyewitness identification. 
Defendant claims his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to move, without 
strategic purpose, to suppress the victim's eyewitness identification as unreliable under 
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, as applied in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 
(Utah 1991). Aplt. Br. at 46-50. He claims the identification failed to sufficiently satisfy the 
Ramirez criteria, particularly with respect to alleged inconsistencies in the victim's 
description of the robber throughout the prosecution. Aplt. Br. at 47-49. The claim fails to 
recognize that the identification was superior to and more consistent than the identification 
in Ramirez. 
In Ramirez, the court listed the following pertinent factors for determining the 
reliability of an eyewitness identification: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the witness's 
capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) 
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and 
relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as whether the event was an 
ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed, and whether 
the race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781 (quoting Long, 111 P.2d at 493). Defendant's claim fails under Ramirez. 
Opportunity of victim to view defendant during the robbery. The robber approached 
Neiser to within about two feet, sticking the gun within inches of Neiser's face (R.253:3, 9, 
14). The encounter lasted for about four or five minutes (R.254:19, 33). Although the area 
was not well-lit, there was sufficient light from a street lamp across the street for Nieser to 
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see the robber (R.253:8; 254:46-47). From Neiser's description that the robber had short 
hair, a goatee, and facial hair, it is apparent that the robber was unmasked (R.253:9). 
Victim's degree of attention to robber at the time of event. The robbery obviously 
had Nieser's full attention—the robber thrust a gun to within inches of Nieser's face, Nieser 
was concerned about getting shot, and a number of minutes passed before his heart rate 
slowed down and he felt prepared to call the police (R.253:5, 8; 254:16, 22). 
Victim's capacity to observe the event including his physical and mental acuity. 
Nieser acknowledged that the encounter scared him and that as a result his heart rate 
was elevated, and that he was unable to fully direct his attention to what the writing on his 
assailant's shirt said (R.253:5, 8; 254:22) There is no evidence that there were any other 
contributors to possible impairment—"personal motivations, biases or prejudices, . . . 
uncorrected visual defects, or . . . fatigue, injury, drugs, or alcohol." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
783. Indeed, Neiser's straitforward recounting of his experience, along with the specificity 
of his description, shows that his capacity to observe was not materially impaired. 
Whether the victim's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent, or whether it was the product of suggestion. Nieser's identification of defendant 
was spontaneous as soon as the missing piece in his image of the robber was supplied. 
Nieser was taken by Detective Wallace to the showup, at most within an hour of the robbery.8 
8Neiser thought he was brought to the showup "about a good half-hour [after the 
robbery]," which he thought occurred shortly after 6:30 or 6:40 p.m. (R.253:6; 354:12-
15). Detective Wallace said that he took Nieser to the showup "sometime past 7:00 p.m. 
(R.254:89-90). The booking sheet shows that defendant was arrested at "1930,f (R.14) 
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Detective Wallace told Nieser that the officers had "a possible" suspect and wanted to see 
if Nieser could identify him "to see if it was the same person" (R.254:89-90). Defendant was 
outside when they arrived; Wallace turned his lights on to illuminate the suspect (R.254:24, 
39, 90). Nieser, sitting in the back seat of the police vehicle, was at the time between thirty 
and thirty-seven feet from defendant (R.253:6; 254:24-25, 40, 90). Wallace again asked 
Neiser if he could positively identify defendant as the robber (R.254:91). 
Neiser told Wallace he recognized defendant—Hispanic, with "scraggly facial hair," 
the height and weight he had described, wearing black baggy pants and white tennis shoes, 
but the defendant was wearing a different shirt (R.253:7; 254:25-26,29,91). As soon as two 
of defendant's two overlaying shirts were lifted, Neiser recognized the third shirt—"[the 
same] blue shirt with writing on it"— and positively identified defendant as the robber 
(R.253:7, 10; 254:26-30, 41, 91-92; St. Exh. 3 &4). 
Neiser's identification remained consistent. He identified defendant as the robber at 
the preliminary hearing and at trial (R.253:7; 254:30). In identifying defendant as the robber 
at trial, Nieser also recalled that defendant wore the same smirk depicted in a photograph 
taken the night of this arrest as he wore during the robbery (R.254:16-17,29-30,35; State's 
Ex. 3). Neiser also identified defendant from a photograph taken the night he was arrested 
(R.254:27; State's Ex. 4).9 
defendant's arguments that Nieser's identification "varied over time and did not 
match Hernandez," Aplt. Br. at 47 and 47 n.8 are insubstantial. Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, Neiser consistently said defendant's height was 57" or 5'8", and never said 
5'10" (R.253:12; 254:22, 38; Defendant's 23B Ex 20). He testified at the preliminary 
hearing that defendant's weight was between 130 and 140 pounds (R.253:12; 254:22), a 
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The nature of the event observed by the victim and the likelihood that he would 
perceive, remember and relate it correctly. In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the 
supreme court observed that people tend to specifically and fairly clearly remember the 
details of significant events. Id. at 489. The robbery certainly galvanized Neiser's attention. 
He testified that the situation scared him and he was worried about getting shot (R.253:8; 
254:22). 
modest difference. 
Neiser testified consistently that the writing was across the front of his assailant's 
shirt (R.253:9;254:22). Defendant's challenge regarding Neiser's observation of his 
assailant's footwear establishes only that Neiser occasionally forgot some details or how 
he had testified about the footwear, but that he consistently said his assailant wore "white 
athletic" or "white tennis" shoes. Similarly, Neiser consistently testified at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial that defendant appeared "a little Hispanic" (R.235:5; 
254:21, 37). A sensitive and realistic reading of all the testimony about why defendant's 
hair style and goatee created that impression for Neiser is not that he was too casual about 
his assessment, but that in the heat of the moment and the "general" darkness of the place, 
defendant simply appeared Hispanic for subtle reasons that he did not precisely recall—"I 
don't know, he just did. He looked Hispanic to me" (R.253:7-8; 254:37, 44-45, 47). 
Neiser did not describe to dispatch that his assailant had a scar on his forehead and 
an earring in his left ear, as defendant evidently did on the night of the robbery (R.254:45; 
State's Ex. 3). In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. 
Finally, defendant's suggestion that his gun was not the weapon used in the 
robbery is problematic. Neiser consistently testified that the robber's gun had some 
"silver" on it (R.253:3-4, 9; 254:16). Although Officer Brede testified at trial that he 
"believed" that dispatch reported that the gun was black, his report, written hours after the 
incident, indicated only that a gun was used in the robbery (R.254:74; Defendant's 23B 
Ex. 20). Officer Brede testified that the gun they found on defendant was a Ruger P89 
handgun with a chrome, nickel, or aluminum slide—"a silver slide" (R.253:18-19). At 
trial, he identified the Ruger P89 handgun as the one he took from defendant (R.254:58; 
State's Ex. 2). Contrary to defendant's assertion, there was no evidence presented at trial 
that the gun was not black or that it had no silver or chrome on it. Thus, the weight of 
evidence confirmed that the gun used by the robber had "silver" on it, as defendant's gun 
did. 
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In sum, Neiser's identification amply sufficed to preclude any serious consideration 
of a motion to suppress under Ramirez, Neiser, unimpaired by any condition other than the 
stress that would normally attend a frightening experience, observed defendant for several 
minutes at very close range, in adequate lighting. His description of defendant was fairly 
detailed, substantially matched defendant's appearance, especially as to his clothing, and 
remained consistent throughout the proceedings. Finally, the circumstances of Neiser's 
identification at the showup were far less suggestive than those in Ramirez, the only aspect 
of an eyewitness identification which the Ramirez court found "troublesome" in a case 
describing a weaker basis for reliability in every particular than in this case, and yet in which 
the identification was found constitutionally reliable. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.10 See State 
v. Hollen, 2002 UT 35, ^ f 64, 44 P.3d 794, (recognizing Ramirez as the benchmark against 
which challenges to eyewitness identification reliability are measured). 
10
 In Ramirez, the eyewitness, all the time under attack from a pipe-wielding 
accomplice to the offense, identified the masked gunman (the defendant) as he hid behind 
the comer of a building at a distance variously described as from ten to thirty feet. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 776, 782-784. The eyewitness viewed the defendant in time periods 
variously described as from one second to a minute or longer in lighting variously 
described as from "good" to "poor." Id. at 782-783. Prior to the showup, police officers 
told the eyewitnesses that they had apprehended a suspect who matched the description 
given to them. Id. at 784. At the showup conducted in the middle of the night, the 
Ramirez court held that "[considering the facts in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's decision and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor 
evidence, we cannot say that [the eyewitness's] testimony is legally insufficient when 
considered in light of the other circumstances to warrant a preliminary finding of 
reliability and, therefore, admissibility." Id. 
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Because a motion to suppress Neiser's identification as constitutionally unreliable 
would have been futile, counsel was not ineffective in foregoing the attempt. 
Moreover, and in spite of defense counsel's assertion that he had no strategic reason 
for his failure to move to suppress the eyewitness identification (Defendant's 23V Ex. 17, 
p.2), counsel effectively and skillfully exploited whatever weakness existed in the 
identification throughout the proceedings to support his principal defense of 
misidentification.(R253:7-14^ 
requested the detailed eyewitness identification instruction approved in Long, 721 P.2d at 
494-95 n.8, and argued its application deliberately to the jury. See Eyewitness identification 
instruction, R.159, 161-64, Addendum D; R.254:118-20. See State v. Mecham, 2000 UT 
App 247, fflf 15-16, 22-23, 9 P.3d 777 (rejecting claim of deficient performance where 
motion to suppress eyewitness identification would have been futile and counsel "had some 
success in impeaching and undermining the witness's identification at trial"). In sum, 
defendant has failed to show that his counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress the 
identification. 
2. Suppression of gun and defendant's statements. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to move, 
without strategic purpose, to suppress the discovery of the gun he was carrying and his 
statements when he was arrested, in violation of his right under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures. Aplt. Br. at 42-
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46.11 He claims that because he appeared differently than as described by the victim, the 
officers lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him at the Flying J. Aplt. Br. at 43-44. The 
claim fails because a motion to suppress would also have been futile: defendant's statements 
and the discovery of the gun flowed from a consensual encounter and, if not, from the 
officers' reasonable belief that defendant matched the victim's description of the robber. 
Utah courts have recognized two levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between police officers and the public: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may 
[temporarily] seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime . . . ." State v. Deadman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 
(Utah 1987) (per curium) (citations omitted); accord Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 
^|10,998P.2d274. 
"A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an officer." 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^  34,63 P.3d 650. Because "the encounter is consensual, and 
the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment."Id. In contrast, "[a] level two encounter involves an investigative detention [or 
11
 To the extent that defendant implies that his trial counsel ever acknowledged 
that his failure to move to suppress defendant's statements and the gun was deliberate and 
without a strategic basis, defendant is mistaken. Counsel never testified to such effect, 
nor does his affidavit in support of defendant's motion for a rule 23B remand support 
such an inference. See Rule 23B Affidavit of Trial Counsel, Defendant's 23B Ex. 17. 
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seizure] that is usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive." Id. at Tf 35. The United 
States Supreme Court has explained that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning for 
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave." United States 
v. Mendenhall 446 U.SA. 544, 100 S. Ct 1870, 1877 (1980). 
Seizure is marked by police use "of physical force or a show of authority" such that 
the person's "freedom of movement is restrained." Id. at 553, 100 S. Ct. at 1877. Factors 
suggestive of a seizure include: "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of 
a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, [and] the use of 
language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be 
compelled." Id. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877; accord Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 41. 
A review of the foregoing factors reveals that defendant was not detained during his 
encounter with Officers Brede and Mclnnes until after he made an inculpatory statement and 
admitted possession of the gun. The officers approached defendant, and asked if they could 
speak with him (R.253:17; R.254:56). Defendant agreed to talk, and the parties moved into 
an adjacent area (R.253:17; 254:56). In response to defendant's inquiry, the officers 
explained that defendant matched the description of a suspect in a crime that had recently 
occurred in the area (R.253:18). The officers then asked defendant whether he had a weapon 
(R.253:18; 254:56). When defendant said he did not, Officer Mclnnes asked, "Being that 
this crime involved a gun, do you mind if I Terry frisk you for a weapon?" (R. 253:18; 254: 
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56-57).12 Defendant then admitted he had a gun and told the officers that it was in the 
waistband of his pants (R. 253:18; 254:57). At that point, the officers took control of 
defendant's hands, handcuffed him, and removed the gun (R. 253: 18; 254:57). 
The foregoing facts were not indicative of a seizure. Only two officers respectfully 
presented themselves to defendant, requesting, rather than demanding, that he speak with 
them. Neither of the officers displayed a weapon, threatened defendant in any way, or 
otherwise compelled his cooperation, even when requesting his permission to frisk him. 
Only when defendant admitted he was carrying a gun, did the officers seize him. Thus, 
defendant's admission that he possessed a gun, which unquestionably justified its seizure and 
proved that he had earlier lied, was the product of a consensual encounter beyond the reach 
of the Fourth Amendment and any suppression motion. Indeed, defendant concedes that "he 
went with [the police] willingly." Aplt. Br. at 50. But even if the encounter were not 
consensual, the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant on suspicion of 
robbery and to question him about a gun for their own safety as soon as they found him at 
the Flying J. 
"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
12
 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 92 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968) (holding that police 
officers, for their protection, were authorized to conduct a limited search of persons 
reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous). 
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actions." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2004). Additionally, "[w]here a police officer 
. . . reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may 
conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual, [or question the individual 
regarding the presence of weapons,] to discover weapons that might be used against him." 
State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, % 13,37 P.3d270 (quoting State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 
659 (Utah 1985)), affd, 2003 UT 36, 78 P. 3d 590. 
In light of additional circumstances, a matching description constitutes reasonable 
suspicion to frisk a person suspected of a dangerous offense. Carter, 1Q1 P.2d at 660 
(reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant who had bulge in pocket and matched the 
description of burglary suspect located less than one block from crime scene, one-half hour 
after crime was reported). Defendant argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 
frisk him because the description the victim gave to dispatch differed from his actual 
description—instead of being Hispanic, 5'8" to 5'10" weighing about one hundred sixty 
pounds and wearing a blue shirt, defendant appears to be Caucasian who is 5'4" weighing 
one hundred forty-five pounds and who was wearing a black shirt. Aplt. Br. at 43-44. 
The discrepancies defendant cites are insufficient to negate reasonable suspicion to 
detain and frisk defendant in light of all the circumstances. See Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 
9 A3 R.2d 231,236 (Utah App. 1994) (reasonable suspicion sufficiently established if suspect 
"substantially" matches an informant's description (citation omitted); State v. Smoot, 921 
P.2d 1003,1007 (Utah App. 1994) (reasonable suspicion to detain for questioning individual 
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reasonably suspected of recent burglaries even though his description was inconsistent with 
extant descriptions of suspect).13 The victim described his assailant to dispatch as "a little 
Hispanic," male about twenty years old with a goatee, unshaven that day, about 5'7" or 5'8" 
tall and between 130 and 140 pounds, who was wearing black baggy pants, a blue shirt with 
writing across the front, and white athletic shoes (R.253:4, 9, 12,20-22,25; 254:21-23, 38-
39,43,47, 52-53). The officers found defendant, whom they thought matched the victim's 
description, at the Flying J—a male in his twenties with facial hair, wearing dark baggy 
jeans, a blue sweatshirt or pullover with a hood, and white athletic shoes (R.253:17, 25; 
254:52-56, 67). 
The victim's description of the robber is substantially consistent with defendant's 
appearance as the officers found him. Moreover, the discrepancies are overstated. Contrary 
to defendant's assertion, Officer Brede did not recall receiving a height and weight 
description (R.254:65). Moreover, it is uncertain that defendant's recorded height is without 
footwear (R.14). Thus, defendant was within the victim's weight description and within a 
13
 See also People v. Carlson, 111 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) 
(reasonable suspicion to stop suspect "whose physical appearance, including an article of 
clothing worn in the first and third incident [sic] was substantially similar to the 
composite description of the perpetrator [described in three recent local burglaries]") 
(emphasis added); People v. Conrad, 572 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 (111. App. Ct. 1991) 
(reasonable suspicion to stop suspect in vicinity of suspected burglary who matched 
general description of suspect but who was wearing several different articles of clothing 
than those reported); People v. Bandy, 306 N.W.2d 465, 466-67 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) 
(reasonable suspicion to pat-down suspect whose description closely matched armed 
escapee, except as to age, at location escapee was known to have recently contacted). 
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few inches of his height description. Although Officer Brede acknowledged that defendant 
appeared white, the victim testified that the robber appeared "a little [bit] Hispanic." Further, 
the distinction between a blue shirt and a black shirt is trivial considering the robbery 
occurred at night. The officer stated his opinion that defendant matched dispatch's 
description based on a number of factors, apart from any racial discrepancy (R.254:66-67). 
Additionally, defendant was located only four blocks from the crime scene within about half 
an hour of a robbery that the officers knew had been committed with a gun (R.253:2,24-25; 
254:12,54-55). 
On these facts, the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion for detaining 
defendant. Consequently, reasonably competent counsel would have known that moving to 
suppress evidence of defendant's statement and the gun would have been futile. 
C. Trial counsel performed competently in timely moving to suppress 
defendant's prior strong-arm robbery conviction; defendant has not 
shown prejudice because he did not testify at trial. 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing before trial a 
motion to suppress evidence of defendant's prior strong-arm robbery conviction. Aplt. Br. 
at 34-40. He argues that if his counsel had filed an adequately briefed motion which fully 
described the facts of the conviction, the evidence would have been suppressed under the rule 
609, Utah Rules of Evidence (providing for impeachment with prior felony conviction), as 
applied in State v. Banner, 717 P.d 1325 (Utah 1986). Aplt. Br. at 36-39. In the alternative, 
he argues that if counsel was not ineffective, the trial court erred in ruling the prior 
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conviction to be admissible. Aplt. Br. at 40. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails because 
his counsel timely brought the motion to the trial court's attention. More importantly, 
defendant fails to show, either as a matter of ineffective assistance of counsel or trial court 
error, that he was prejudiced because he did not testify and the prior conviction was never 
introduced into evidence. 
1. The factual background 
Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine asking the trial court to exclude 
any evidence of statements defendant had made concerning his prior robbery conviction, his 
owing fines in any jurisdiction, and several statements regarding his religious commitment 
and prior conviction (R. 177-78). At trial, the State stipulated to the motion (R.254:4-5). 
After the State presented its case-in-chief, defense counsel asked the court whether 
it was going to allow evidence, if defendant testified, of defendant's prior "strong-arm" 
robbery conviction for which he was on probation at the time of the current 
charge(R.254:96).14 Defense counsel argued that Banner, which addressed rule 609, Utah 
14
 A pre-sentence report prepared after defendant pleaded guilty in federal court 
on firearms charges indicates that defendant was convicted of burglary for an incident on 
December 3, 1997, and robbery for an incident on December 13, 1997 (R.189-98). 
During the December 3 incident, defendant and his brother broke into a restaurant in 
Wyoming and stole a cash box containing approximately $1,180 in cash (R. 188-89). 
During the December 13 incident, defendant and his brother "were involved in a crime 
spree where vehicles were stolen and property was taken from others, sometimes by 
force" (R. 188-89). During the spree, defendant jumped from a stolen car and grabbed the 
purse of a woman as she was walking from a grocery store to her car (R. 188-89). The 
woman fell as defendant pulled her purse away (R. 188-89). Defendant then "jumped 
back into the car as it sped away" (R. 188-89). 
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Rules of Evidence, did not support the admission of such "extremely prejudicial" evidence 
"when it's the same kind of charge" (R.96-97). When the court indicated it "would probably 
allow it," defense counsel noted "for the record" that he did not know whether the State was 
"aware of any of the details specifically of that crime. The may have a copy of the 
conviction, but I understand your ruling" (R.254:97). The State offered no argument for or 
against the admission of the conviction (R.254:96-97). Defendant did not testify at trial and 
evidence of the conviction was never presented to the jury (R.254:98). 
At the 23B hearing, the prosecutor testified that had no intention of introducing 
evidence of defendant's prior criminal history, and that he would have stipulated to the 
exclusion of defendant's entire criminal history if defendant's motion had so requested 
(R.478:8). 
Defendant testified that he did not commit the robbery, that when he was arrested he 
was waiting for a money transfer from his family, and that he had been on the telephone with 
his family twice within thirty minutes around the time of the robbery (R.478:14-15). He 
asserted that he did not testify at trial because he was instructed that his character might be 
attacked with his criminal record (R.478:16). If he had known that his criminal history was 
not going to be admitted, defendant claimed, he would have talked about himself, the 
telephone calls he had with his family, and the wire he expected from his grandmother 
A notation at the top of the pre-sentence report suggests that it was not faxed to 
defense counsel until after defendant's trial in this case (R. 183-98). 
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(R.478:17-18). 
Defendant's trial counsel testified that he wanted defendant to testify, but counseled 
him otherwise when the court denied his motion to exclude defendant's prior robbery 
conviction (R.478:68). He thought defendant's testimony would have been helpful because 
he thought defendant presented himself as a very articulate, sincere, and believable person 
(R.478:69). 
The trial court found that defense counsel neither performed deficiently nor prejudiced 
defendant by not seeking to suppress defendant's prior conviction before trial. The court 
stated that it would have heard a motion in limine at trial and that even if it had been filed 
pretrial, the court would probably have taken it under advisement, pending whether 
defendant intended to testify—"I cannot fault [trial counsel] for that" (R.478:127-31). The 
court also found that although the prosecutor stated that he did not intend to introduce 
evidence of defendant's prior convictions, he regarded the prosecutor's expression only as 
contingent on defendant's not testifying and that the prosecutor's perspective on 
impeachment might reasonably change if defendant had testified (R.478:129-30). The 
court's findings reflect its comments at the rule 23B hearing (R.478:472-73). 
2. Counsel performed effectively and defendant has not shown prejudice. 
The trial court's rule 23B findings and remarks demonstrate that defense counsel was 
not ineffective for not moving before trial to exclude defendant's prior conviction. In Luce 
v. United States, 469 U.S.38,105 S. Ct. 460 (1984), the Court considered a challenge to the 
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denial of a motion in limine to exclude a prior conviction under rule 609 (a)( 1), Federal Rules 
of Evidence.15 Id. at 41-43, 105 S. Ct. at 463-64. The Court observed that because a 
defendant's decision to testify and the government's decision to impeach shifts as the case 
unfolds, "the district court is free, in exercise of sound discretion, to alter a previous in limine 
ruling." Id. at 41-42, 105 S. Ct. at 463. 
The trial court in this case reflected the same view regarding the timing of a motion 
under rule 609 (a)(1) as that noted in Luce, thereby refuting any claim that trial counsel acted 
deficiently in not earlier filing his motion in limine. As the trial court put it, defense counsel 
strategically waited to assess the course of the trial before deciding if defendant should testify 
(R.472). Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, trial counsel adequately presented his 
motion to the court. He specifically argued under Banner—the primary case identifying the 
standard by which a trial court must evaluate the admissibility of evidence under rule 
609(a)(1)—that admission of defendant's prior robbery conviction was "extremely 
prejudicial" evidence "when it's the same kind of charge" R.96-97).16 Additionally, the court 
15
 See Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334 (turning to federal decisions to interpret rule 609, 
which is the federal rule verbatim). 
16
 In Banner\ the court identified five factors to be considered in determining "that 
the probative value of admitting evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." Id. at 717 
P.2d at 1334 (quoting rule 609 (a)(1)): 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character for veracity of the 
witness[;] [2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction [;] [3] the 
resemblance may lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person[;] [4] 
the importance of credibility issues in determining the truth in a prosecution 
tried without decisive nontestimonial evidence^] [5] the importance of the 
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was correctly informed that the offence occurred between 1993 and 1998, and it correctly 
surmised that if defendant testified he would assert his innocence (R.254:96-97). Thus, as 
a result of counsel's urging his motion, the court was aware of all the criteria identified in 
Banner. In these circumstances, counsel did not perform ineffectively. 
Even if counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately move to exclude defendant's 
prior conviction or the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion, defendant has 
failed to show the prejudice required under rule 609 by failing to testify. In Luce, the Court 
held that a defendant must testify in order to preserve a rule 609 issue for appeal. Id. at 41, 
105 S. Ct. At 463. The Court noted that "[Requiring a defendant to testify in order to 
preserve Rule 609(a) claims enables that reviewing court to determine the impact any 
erroneous impeachment may have in light of the record as a whole, and tends to discourage 
making motions to exclude impeachment evidence solely to 'plant' reversible error in the 
event of conviction." Id. at 42, 105 S. Ct. at 474. The Utah Supreme Court has followed 
Luce} by requiring that the defendant testify in order to preserve for appellate review a claim 
of improper impeachment with a prior conviction. State v. Gentry, 1A1 P.2d 1032, 1036 
(Utah 1987). See also State v. Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128, ffl 10-14, 47 P.3d 111 
(applyingZwce and Gentry, in concluding that preservation of challenge to admission of past 
robbery offense under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence required that defendant testify). 
accused's testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for veracity. (Citation omitted). 
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Defendant failed to testify. Thus, evidence of the prior conviction did not come in. 
It is now impossible to assess what would have happened if defendant had testified. 
Defendant, therefore, has not carried his heavy burden of showing that he was prejudiced by 
his counsel's alleged deficient performance. 
D. Defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for not 
investigating witnesses who were not sufficiently disclosed to him; 
any error was harmless because evidence of guilt was substantial. 
Defendant claims his trial counsel violated his rights under article I, sections 7 and 12 
of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by 
rendering him ineffective assistance of counsel.17 Aplt. Br. at 30-31. Specifically, defendant 
argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present at trial the 
testimony of witnesses who would have testified that defendant was talking to them on the 
telephone from the Flying J at about the time of the robbery. Aplt. Br. at 30-34.18 Defendant 
17
 The State responds only as to defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. See 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 185 (considering ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought 
under Sixth Amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution only under the 
federal constitution where the defendant failed to provide any authority for the 
proposition that guarantees under the state constitution differed from those of the United 
States Constitution). 
18
 Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was deficient in not moving for a 
new trial, based on the same failure to investigate and present witness testimony. Aplt. 
Br. at 34. This argument is superfluous. The issue before this Court is whether defense 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not investigating certain witnesses and not 
presenting their testimony at trial. Defendant received the same hearing under rule 23B 
that he would have received on a new trial motion. Indeed, defendant's argument is frilly 
based on the testimony of those witnesses defense counsel was allegedly deficient in not 
investigating. Aplt. Br. at 12-17, 30-34 and attached Findings in Addendum. 
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also claims that in light of the paucity of evidence of his guilt, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a different result had such testimony been presented to the jury. Aplt Br. at 33. The claim 
fails because defendant did not sufficiently identify the witnesses to his trial counsel before 
trial. Therefore, defendant's counsel did not perform objectively unreasonably. Moreover, 
defendant has not shown prejudice because evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial. 
1. Factual background 
When Officers Brede and Mclnnis initially approached defendant at the Flying J and 
explained that defendant matched the description of a suspect in a crime that had recently 
occurred in the area, defendant told them he was waiting for a Western Union telegram 
(R.253:18). Defendant believed he could receive a money transfer based on his conversation 
with some trucker (R.478:12). However, no Western Union services were offered at the 
Flying J at that time (R.253:18; Stipulated Affidavit of Ted Tomlinson, State's 23B Ex. 2). 
At the rule 23B hearing, defendant claimed that he had difficulty reaching his attorney 
before trial and that he left messages for his attorney that he had important information 
(R.478:13-14). Defendant testified that he told his attorney that at the time of his arrest he 
was waiting for a money transfer from his family, which could be verified, and that he had 
been on the telephone with his family twice within thirty minutes (R.478:14-15). At the 
preliminary hearing, he suggested that trial counsel obtain the Flying J's telephone records 
(R.47 8:12-16). He also claimed that for the first time at the hearing he told trial counsel that 
at about the time of the robbery he had been speaking on the telephone with his aunt, 
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Amanda Hernandez, and his grandmother, Margaret Puebla. He claimed that he gave trial 
counsel his aunt's telephone number at that time (R.478:28-29). 
Trial counsel repeatedly testified at the rule 23B hearing that he recalled having heard 
from defendant before trial something about tracking down people with whom defendant had 
been on the phone with and that defendant might have an alibi. Trial counsel did not 
remember however, defendant's having given him sufficient information to follow up on the 
alibi (R.478:47, 51, 75-76, 87). Particularly, trial counsel did not think that defendant had 
given him the specific names or telephone numbers of people, but rather just relationships, 
like "relative, mother, aunt. . . grandmother" (R.478:74-75). 
After receiving a telephone call on October 10,2002, from defendant, two days after 
sentencing, trial counsel contacted defendant's relatives (R.477; 478:52). His notes 
referencing the call indicated that defendant had telephone records, that defendant requested 
that counsel call his aunt, Amanda Hernandez, at a specified number, and noted, "12/5 @ 
6:22 p.m.," a telephone number, "(801) 973-7724," and "7 min" (R.478:52-53; Defendant's 
23B Ex. 5). Thereafter, trial counsel pursued his contact with Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Puebla 
to obtain telephone records of calls allegedly made around the time the robbery was 
committed (R.478:54-59; Defendant's 23B Ex. 6-13). 
When finally obtained, the telephone records revealed the following facts: (1) Ms. 
Hernandez received a telephone call from a phone at the Flying J on the night of the robbery 
at 6:53 p.m. (Affidavits of Kath Panteloglow, State's 23B Ex. 1 & 3); Ms. Puebla sent a 
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money transfer in the amount of $45.00 on the night of the robbery, which was refunded to 
her seven days later (Defendant's 23B Ex. 22). 
After sentencing, trial counsel filed an untimely motion to arrest judgment, which did 
not include information related to the defendant's telephone conversations with his family 
(R.478:59-60; Defendant's 23B Ex. 14). Trial counsel didnotknow what the time frame was 
for filing a new trial motion was or if that motion was different from a motion to arrest 
judgment (R.478:59-60, 62). 
Trial counsel believed the gap between the phone calls was too great to support an 
argument that defendant had been on the telephone when the robbery was committed 
(R.478:62-63; Defendant's 23B Ex 16). He knew about the wire from Margaret Puebla 
before trial. However, neither the fact of defendant's awaiting a wire from his grandmother, 
nor defendant's noting a possible alibi, indicated anything about a telephone call (R.478:64, 
76-77; Defendant's 23B Ex. 4). Morever, he did not think that information about defendant's 
receiving money from someone was particularly helpful because it still would not negate a 
motive for the robbery (R.478:64-65). 
At the 23B hearing, Amanda Hernandez confirmed that on December 5,2001, the date 
of the robbery, defendant called her to ask if she would allow him to charge her telephone 
account for a call he wanted to make to his grandmother (R.478:107-08). The call was made 
at 6:22 p.m., and it lasted for seven minutes (R.478:107-08). Her telephone bill supported 
that contention and that defendant charged a call to his grandmother, made at 6:53 p.m. 
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(R.478:108-ll; Defendant's 23B Ex. 21). However, Ms. Hernandez had no recollection 
whether or when she might have been contacted by trial counsel's office (R.478:109). She 
did recall sending trial counsel the telephone records, although she did not know when 
(R.478:109-110). She stated that if asked she would have testified as to the telephone calls 
(R.478:110). 
Margaret Puebla also confirmed that defendant called her to ask for some money to 
return from Salt Lake. She wired the money (R.478:112-16; Defendant's 23B Ex. 22). No 
one from Trial counsel's office contracted her before trial; however, around October 8, the 
date of sentencing, she heard from Amanda, her daughter-in-law and defendant's aunt, that 
trial counsel wanted to talk with her (R.478:117-18). She did not fax the information 
concerning her wire to defendant until after October 25, 2002 (R.478:l 18-19). She also 
would have been available to testify at trial about the wire that she sent (id). 
The trial court made the following findings: 
• Although defendant did not specifically provide the names of his relatives, 
Ms. Hernandez and Ms.Puebla, who could serve as alibi witnesses, trial 
counsel had sufficient information before trial to investigate them (Findings, 
R.473, Tflf 11-12, Addendum C); 
• Evidence supported Ms. Hernandez's and Ms. Puebla's respective 
telephone contacts with defendant and the attempted wire transfer to him 
on the night of the offense supporting defendant's efforts to obtain money to 
get home to Wyoming from Salt Lake (R.473-74, ffi[ 14 a-h & 15 a, b); 
• Ms. Hernandez was on the telephone with defendant from "approximately 
6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m.," which was confirmed by her telephone bill (R.474, ^  
14 d), that defendant called Mr. Puebla at 6:53 p.m., a call which also lasted 
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seven minutes, and that both witnesses would have testified to the timing and 
substance of their conversations with defendant (R.474, ^ 14 d, f, 15); 
• Defense counsel did not investigate these two witnesses before trial, which 
failure caused the court "great concern" (R.473, ^  13, 474, f 16); 
• The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts showed that the robbery was 
committed within a narrow period of time, and that "it may have made a 
significant difference if Amanda Hernandez, Margaret Puebla, and the phone 
records had been available for Mr. Hernandez's defense" (R.473-74, T[17); 
• Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Puebla were not true alibi witnesses because "their 
testimony would not have established that defendant was on the telephone with 
them at the same time the robbery was committed," but they were significant 
witnesses because they would have strengthened the defense (R.474, f^ 19); 
• Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to call Ms. Hernandez and 
Ms. Puebla (R.474, Tf 20). 
2. The trial court's conclusion that defendant was prejudiced 
because trial counsel did not investigate certain witnesses 
before trial is unsupported by the record. 
Any valid alibi or defense that suggested that defendant could not have reached the 
crime scene from the Flying J in time to commit the robbery would be significant to the 
defense. However, several of the trial court's "findings" with regard to such crucial evidence 
and defense counsel's ability to identify a specific witness from his communications with 
defendant are unsupported by the record.19 
19
 The trial court's "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 23B Remand" 
set out only "Findings of Fact," without identifying conclusions of law (R470-75). 
Nevertheless, the court's "findings" that "trial counsel had enough information before 
trial to investigate [Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Puebla]," and that they were "significant 
defense witnesses that would have given defendant a stronger defense," that "may have 
made a significant difference," are essentially conclusions of law (R473-75, ^} 12, 17, 
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a. The trial court's conclusion that trial counsel had sufficient 
information to identify Ms. Hernandez before trial is incorrect. 
The court concluded that "[w]hile defendant's trial counsel may not have been told 
the specific name and contact information for Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla until 
after trial, trial counsel had enough information before trial to investigate these witnesses" 
(R.473, 112). This conclusion, as to Ms. Hernandez, upon which the court's ultimate 
conclusion that defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to call these witnesses at 
trial substantially rests (R.475, \ 20), is unsupported by the record.20 
The only evidence in support of the court's conclusion is as follows:21 
19). 
20
 The State does not dispute that counsel had sufficient information to locate Ms. 
Puebla. Trial counsel acknowledged that he knew about the wire from Ms. Puebla before 
trial (R.478:64-65). 
21
 The State does not include defendant's rule 23B testimony because it is 
apparent that the trial court doubted defendant's credibility. If the trial court had not 
doubted defendant's credibility, it would have found, in accord with defendant's 
testimony, that defendant had specifically identified his grandmother and aunt by name 
and provided his aunt's telephone number to Trial counsel before trial (R.478:28-29). 
There were a number of reasons for doubting defendant's claims that he had given his 
counsel specific information: (1) defendant never gave his counsel additional information 
regarding telephone calls with his family in any of his appearances in court before trial 
(R.478:30); (2) trial counsel's two pages of notes taken at trial do not show anything 
about defendant's aunt or grandmother or the telephone calls made to them (R.478:31; 
State's 23B Ex. 6); (3) copies of defendant's telephone message to Legal Defenders reveal 
only a single pretrial attempt to contact trial counsel and those messages do not mention 
defendant's relatives or the telephone calls (R. 478:32-36; State's 23B Ex. 7); and (4) in a 
letter to his appellate counsel after trial, defendant clearly suggested that he had not been 
able to provide Trial counsel with any specifics regarding the telephone calls to his family 
because he had "just barely gotten in contact with [his] family" (R.478:36-37; State's 23B 
Ex. 8). 
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• Trial counsel acknowledged having heard from defendant before trial 
"something" about tracking down people defendant had been on the phone 
with and that he might have an alibi (R.478:47); 
• Trial counsel believed that people identified by defendant as helpful were 
only described by relationships, like "relative, mother, aunt. . . grandmother" 
(R.478:74-75). 
This evidence fails to show that trial counsel had enough information to investigate 
Ms. Hernandez. Indeed, trial counsel repeatedly testified, without challenge, that he did not 
remember defendant's having given him sufficient information to follow up on defendant's 
alibi claim (R.478:47, 51, 75-76, 87). 
Although not yet specifically considered in Utah, other jurisdictions have rejected 
claims that counsel performed deficiently by failing to sufficiently investigate when supplied 
with inadequate information to specifically identify and locate witnesses: "An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim cannot rest upon counsel's alleged failure to engage in a 
scavenger hunt for potentially exculpatory information with no detailed instruction on what 
this information may be or where it might be found." United States v. Farr, 297 F.3d 651, 
658 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting claim of deficient performance where defendant failed to supply 
names and addresses of witnesses or the specific substance of their expected testimony); 
United States ex rel Kleba v. McGinnes, 796 F.2d 947, 957-58 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Reddickv. State, 591 S.E.2d 392,402 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (no deficient performance where 
family members failed to fulfill promise to identify and locate witnesses); Scruggs v. State, 
839 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (no ineffective assistance where defendant "only 
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gave his attorney a first name—no last name, address or phone number"); Taylor v. State, 
772 S.W.2d 766, 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (no deficient performance in failing to investigate 
witnesses identified only by nicknames and street-corner addresses); Abshier v. State, 28 P.3 d 
579, 600-02 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (no deficient performance in absence of the 
defendant's affidavit that he informed counsel of specific witnesses); Hinojosa v. State, 659 
S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim where 
defendant failed to name alibi witnesses and "did not identify some of those who could assist 
with his alibi defense until the State had completed presenting its case-in-chief'). 
In this case, defendant failed to provide his counsel with sufficient information to 
locate who among his unnamed "aunt[s]" counsel might have found evidence of an alibi. In 
short, the trial court's conclusion, tantamount to a legal determination of deficient 
performance, was incorrect. Even if, however, the trial court correctly concluded that trial 
counsel could reasonably have investigated Ms. Hernandez before trial, the court's ultimate 
conclusion that defendant was prejudiced was incorrect. 
b. Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's not calling defendant's 
aunt and grandmother to testify because the timeframe established by 
their testimony did not preclude defendant's committing the offense. 
The trial court found that "it may have made a significant difference if Amanda 
Hernandez, Margaret Puebla and the phone record had been available for Mr. Hernandez's 
defense" (R.474-75, \ 17). The court also found "Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla 
were significant defense witnesses that would have given defendant a stronger defense than 
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the defense presented to the jury" (R.475, fflf 19). Consequently, the trial court concluded 
that "defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate and call these 
witnesses" (R.475, Tj 20). The evidence does not support the courts ultimate conclusion. 
The trial court found Ms. Puebla's proffered testimony and evidence significant in 
light of the "narrow period of time" during which the robbery was committed. Thus, the 
"significance" of Ms. Puebla's and Ms. Hernandez's testimony and phone records only 
relates to the possibility that the jury might have believed there was insufficient time for 
defendant to have committed the offense during the time frame established by the witnesses' 
testimony and the related exhibits (R.473-74, fflj 14-15). The evidence stemming from their 
proffered testimony is as follows: 
• Ms. Puebla's testimony and telephone records would have shown that 
defendant called her from the Flying J at 6:53 p.m. and that they spoke for 
seven minutes (Affidavits of Kath Panteloglow, State's 23B Ex. 1& 3; R.474, 
1ffll4f& 15 a; 478:115); 
• Ms. Hernandez's testimony would have shown that defendant called her 
from the Flying J and had a conversation with her from 6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m. 
(R.474, Tfl4d). 
The evidence clearly does not support the trial court's finding that Ms. Hernandez's 
and Ms. Puebla's testimony and phone records would have been so significant to the defense 
that its absence prejudiced defendant. The robbery took place at Freeway Transmission, 
located at 847 West 1700 South in Salt Lake City (R.254:13). The robbery may have been 
committed as early as 6:30 p.m., based onNeiser's testimony. However, Officer Brede only 
received a dispatch about the robbery at 6:39 p.m. (R.254:51). The Flying J is located at 900 
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West and 2100 South (R.254:54-55), little more than four blocks from Freeway 
Transmission. Assuming Neiser was completely mistaken about the time the robbery 
occurred and that it actually occurred just before 6:39 p.m., defendant would still have had 
fourteen minutes to run to the Flying J. Moreover, based on Neiser's testimony, a window 
of at least twenty-four minutes existed in which defendant could have gone to and from the 
Flying J. At the 23B hearing, Kathy Lynch, an investigator with the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, testified that she drove from the Flying J to Freeway Transmission in "one minute or 
less" and ran, but not sprinted, from one location to the other in about five minutes 
(R.478:124-25). Indeed, the trial court noted that Ms. Hernandez and Ms. Puebla were not 
true alibi witnesses "because their testimony would not have established that defendant was 
on the telephone with them at the same time the robbery was committed: (R.475, f 18). In 
short, the court's conclusion that testimony of the absent witnesses was significant and that 
defendant was prejudiced by its absence is incorrect. 
3. Any error in failing to uncover defense witnesses was harmless 
because evidence that defendant committed the robbery was substantial. 
"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting 
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691,104 S. Ct. At 2066. "Attorney errors come in an infinite variety 
and are as likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be prejudicial." Id. 
at 693, 104 S.Ct. At 2067. 
Thus, in addition to showing counsel's deficient performance, defendant must also 
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demonstrate the second Striclandprong: that "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 
Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,874 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 
S. Ct. At 2068). In addition, "[i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693,104 
S. Ct. At 2067. Rather, defendant must show that, absent counsel's acts or omissions, there 
is a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter" of a more favorable result. Chacon, 
962 P.2d at 50 (quotations and citations omitted). See State v. Smith, 700 P.2d 1106, 1112 
(Utah 1985) (holding improper comment harmless when "record contains substantial 
evidence of defendant's guilt"). 
Defendant has not shown that evidence of his telephone conversations with his 
relatives would have exonerated him or had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome 
if presented at his trial. 
First, the trial court's conclusion that defendant was prejudiced by Trial counsel's 
failure to investigate and call defendant's relatives is not a conclusion that this failure would 
likely have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Rather, it only a conclusion that these 
witnesses would have strengthened the defense (R.479:16). 
Second, any deficiency in Trial counsel's performance was harmless. The victim testified 
at defendant's preliminary hearing and trial that the burglary occurred sometime around 6:30 
p.m. and 6:40 p.m. (R.253:2; 254:12). Even if defendant could show that he was on the 
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telephone at the Flying J three blocks away from 6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m. and then again at 
6:53 p.m., this left a narrow margin for defendant to reach the crime scene and twenty-four 
minutes—all within the time given by the victim—to complete the crime. Additionally, 
evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial: (1) defendant was found shortly after the 
robbery was committed, only four blocks from the crime scene (R.24:13, 54-55, 62); (2) 
defendant substantially matched the victim's description of the robber—a male in his 
twenties with facial hair, wearing dark baggy j eans, a blue sweatshirt or pullover with a hood, 
and white athletic shoes (R.254:52-56, 67); (3) when defendant was found shortly after the 
crime, he initially denied having a gun and was then found in possession of a gun similar to 
that described by the victim, including the unique feature that the gun had a "silver" 
component (R.254:56-58); (4) defendant was found wearing the same shirt described by the 
victim, which he had covered up with two other shirts (R.254:26, 28, 91-92; State's Ex. 3); 
(5) defendant wore a distinctive "smirk"on his face during the robbery and in a photograph 
taken shortly afterward (R.254:16-17, 29-30, 35; State's Ex. 2&3); (6) when defendant was 
found, his pulse was rapid (R.354:62); and (7) the victim positively identified defendant as 
the robber at the scene, at the preliminary hearing, and at trial (R.253:7; 254:29,41, 92). The 
mere fact that defendant was on the telephone before and after the crim was committed is 
insufficient to establish that, absent counsel's failure to present this evidence, "there is a 
reasonable probability' of a more favorable result." State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, \ 20,984 
P. 2d 376 (citation omitted). 
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E. Although defense counsel was negligent in 
inadvertently submitting evidence indicating that defendant 
was on parole, defendant fails to show that he was harmed. 
Defendant finally argues that his counsel was ineffective in putting into evidence 
defendant's wallet, which contained business cards from probation and parole officers from 
Wyoming, a card from a needle exchange program, and a letter to defendant from his 
probation and parole officer. Aplt. Br. at 40-42 (See Defendant's 23B Ex. 18). The claim 
fails to demonstrate that defendant was prejudiced by counsel's negligence in introducing the 
wallet's contents. 
1. Factual background. 
On cross-examination of Officer Brede at trial, defense counsel asked Officer Brede to 
identify to sacks of items defendant had with him when he was arrested (R.254:68-70). 
Officer Brede testified that Defense Exhibit 1 was a sack containing defendant's wallet, a 
greyhound ticket, a pouch with personal items in it, a cell phone, and defendant's driver's 
license (R.254:68-69). Defense Exhibit 2 was a pillowcase containing various books and a 
notebook with some computer disks (R.254:70). 
At the close of Officer Brede's testimony, defense counsel asked the court to publish 
his exhibits to the jury (R.254:82). The trial court told counsel that the exhibits could be 
published to the jury after counsel put the individual items from each exhibit back into their 
respective sacks (R.254:82). The court then ordered a brief recess (R.254:83). 
At the 23 B hearing, pursuant to the parties stipulation, the trial court made findings related 
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to the jurors' observation of the wallet and contents (Finding, R.470-72; Stipulation). The 
court found the plastic bag containing defendant's wallet was opened during jury 
deliberations (R.471, Tf 2). However, only one of the jurors, Michael Scown, recalled seeing 
a business card from a Wyoming parole officer in a plastic bag with defendant's wallet 
(R.471, ^ 3a). A second juror, Cheryl Dangerfield, recalled hearing that something in the 
wallet indicated that defendant was on parole; she did not, however, actually see the item, 
but just learned of it from another juror (R.471, f 3b). Four of the remaining jurors, Rebecca 
Walther, Julie McGow, Rafael Gonzalez, and Jose Lozano, recalled seeing one or more 
business cards but do not recall what they were for (R.471, ffif 3c-d). The last two jurors, 
James Morris and Bea Ribgy, recalled seeing the wallet but did not recall seeing any business 
cards (R.471, f^ 3e). None of the jurors recalled seeing any other documentation related to 
defendant's parole R.471, f 3f). The court concluded, "[b]ased on this evidence . . . 
Hernandez suffered no prejudice from trial counsel's's admission of the wallet" (R.472, ^ f 4). 
2. Defendant fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's 
negligence in introducing the wallet's contents. 
Trial counsel's evident purpose in putting into evidence sacks containing defendant's 
personal possessions was to show that he was really in transit at the time he was apprehended 
and that defendant was not simply a low-life likely to commit a street crime—the two sacks 
contained a greyhound ticket, personal items, a notebook containing computer disks, and 
books with such titles as "Death in June" and "The Birth of Tragedy" (R.254:68-70). 
Additionally, counsel elicited from Officer Brede that none of defendant's possessions 
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contained the money that was taken from Nieser (R.254:77-78). Thus, counsel had a clear 
strategic purpose in introducing the contents of the sacks. However, counsel was 
unquestionably negligent in not closely examining the wallet contents before submitting it 
to the jury. Notwithstanding counsel's oversight, defendant has failed to show that he was 
prejudiced by his counsel's negligence. 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights 
of a party shall be disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30. "If the error was harmless, that is, if 
the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it 
affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order." State v. Nichols, 2003 UT 
App 287, f 48, 76 P.3d 1173, cert, denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003). 
In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court found that the 
admission of a prior conviction of theft was improperly admitted to impeach the defendant, 
charged with aggravated robbery. Id. at 656. However, the error was found harmless. Id. 
at 657. Four eyewitnesses were used to identify the defendant, who was discovered with the 
approximate amount of cash taken in the robbery stuffed in his pants. Id. at 656-57. None 
of the eyewitnesses, however, were able to identify the defendant at a lineup seven weeks 
after the incident. Id. at 656-57. Additionally, only the defense "tactfully" mentioned the 
prior conviction on direct examination, to carefully mute any prejudice that might result if 
the prosecution first mentioned it on cross examination. Id. at 657. The prosecution did not 
bring up the prior conviction either on cross examination or in closing argument. Id. 
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The harmlessness of counsel's error is more apparent in this case than it was in Bruce. In 
Bruce, the entire jury improperly heard that the defendant had a prior conviction. In this 
case Just one juror discovered the business card of a parole officer in defendant's wallet and 
only one other construed the card to mean that defendant was on parole. Moreover, evidence 
of defendant's parole status was never mentioned by either defense counsel or the prosecutor 
during examination of witnesses or in closing. Additionally, as set out above, evidence of 
defendant's guilt was substantial and equivalent to that in Bruce. Aple. Br. at Pt. IID4. 
Although defendant was not found with the stolen money, he was found in the vicinity of the 
offense, definitively identified within an hour of the robbery, and found in possession of the 
"silvered' gun identified by the victim. 
In sum, this Court should find that any error resulting from defense counsel's negligent 
handling of the wallet was harmless. Additionally, it should conclude that defendant has 
failed to demonstrate that in no particular of his claim did counsel render ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. ft 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2L. day of July, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney^General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
pgctARATION OF RIGHTS Art I § 7 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law] 
$p* person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law* 
CRIMINAL CODE 
§ 7 6 - 6 - 3 02• Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be ''in the 
course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 
1994, c. 271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003. 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 77—7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect— 
Grounds 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2. 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
R U L E 23B. MOTION TO REMANIXFOR,* FINDINGS NECESSARY TO 
DETERMINATION OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUN-
SEL CLAIM 
(a) Grounds for Motion: Time. A Darty to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move j the court to remanatne case to me trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate court's determination of a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative allegation of 
facts,1 not fully appearing in 'the record on appeal, which, if true,' could support a 
determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior tor the filing of the appellant's briefs Uporf a 
showing of goocj cau^e, thet court may permit a motion fo^be filed after the filing of 
t&e appellant's brief. In no event shall tliQ court permit a'motion to be filed after 
oral argument. Nothing in
 tthis rule shall prohibit the court from remanding the 
case under this rule on its own motion atanv time if the" claim has beenVaised and 
the motion would have been available to a partv. 
(b) Content of Motion; Response; Reply. The content,of the motion shall, 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompa-
nied by affidavits alleging facts not full/ appearing in the record on appeal that 
show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits1 shall also 
allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result^ of 
the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall also be accompanied by a 
proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the 
factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed: The response' 
shall mclude a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims 
and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the 
trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the responding party accepts that 
proposed by the moving party5.'" Any reply shall be filed within 10 days, after thq 
response is filed. * 
(
c) Order of the Court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule liave 
been met, the court'may order that the case be temporarily remanded to the trial 
court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective 
GENERAL PROVISIONS Rule 23B 
assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the ineffectiveness claims 
and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the 
trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the proceedings 
on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by 
the trial court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the 
appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel 
withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on Appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural 
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a 
stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties or upon the 
court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings Before the Trial Court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of 
fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any 
claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand shall not be consid-
ered by the trial court oil remand, unless the trial court determines that the 
interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not specifical-
ly identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted 
without a jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden of proving a 
fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a 
preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter written findings of fact 
concerning the claimed deficient performance by counsel and the claimed prejudice 
suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order of remand. Proceed-
ings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, 
unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and Transmittal of the Record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court reporter 
shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required 
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has 
been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately 
transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the 
supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit 
the record of the supplemental proceedings "upon the preparation of the entire 
record. 
(g) Appellate Court Determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for briefing 
or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during the 
trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. The findings of fact 
entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review 
of findings of fact in other appeals. 
[Adopted effective October 1,1992; amended effective April 1,1998.] 
RULE ,30If:JERRORS AND DEiFEfctS 
WlAhj1 error,r defect, irregularity orjvarianee which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of a party^Tiall be^disregardei 
^(b) Clerical mistakesin|adgmenta£ orders or other part^of the record and errors 
i&the record arising fcom'oyersigl^ orjDmissioii mayL be corrected bf tKg court at? 
any time and after'such* notice; if any/^as the^cpurt^iay order/ 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 609. IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF 
CRIME 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a 
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the 
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever 
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the 
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction 
more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent 
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such 
evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 
such evidence. 
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence 
of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent 
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that 
person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a 
pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not 
admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow 
evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction 
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court 
is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the 
issue of guilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render 
evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is 
admissible. 
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Dominique P. Hernandez, 
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This case is before the court on Defendant's motion to 
remand for the entry of findings of fact pertaining to claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Utah R. App. P. 
23B. 
Defendant has alleged sufficient facts not appearing in the 
record for a remand as to whether trial counsel was ineffective 
for (1) offering Defendant's wallet as evidence at trial, (2) not 
investigating witnesses Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla, and 
(3) not filing a pretrial motion in limine to exclude Defendant's 
prior strong-arm robbery conviction. However, Defendant has not 
alleged sufficient facts not appearing in the record for a remand 
as to whether trial counsel was ineffective for not producing 
evidence that Margaret Puebla wired money to Defendant, not 
moving for a new trial, and not filing motions to suppress the 
gun, Defendant's statements to the officers, and the victim's 
identification of Defendant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded 
for findings relevant to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(c). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, on remand, the trial court shall 
enter findings on the following issues: 
(1) was trial counsel ineffective for 
offering Defendant's wallet at trial, 
including: 
(a) whether the letter from or the 
business cards of Defendant's 
parole/probation officers were 
ORDER 
Case No. 20020879-CA 
FILES Q£$?fiS€T COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 1 2003 
SALTLAKE^DOUNTY ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
visible outside the wallet 
while inside an evidence bag 
submitted to the jury; 
(b) whether the evidence bag was opened 
during deliberations; and 
(c) whether Defendant suffered any 
prejudice from the submission of 
the letter or the business cards; 
(2) was trial counsel ineffective for not 
investigating and producing as alibi 
witnesses Amanda Hernandez and Margaret 
Puebla, including: 
(a) whether prior to trial Defendant 
informed trial counsel of relatives who 
would serve as alibi witnesses, the 
names of those witnesses, and how to 
contact the witnesses; 
(b) whether trial counsel made any 
efforts to locate and interview the 
witnesses; 
(c) the probable testimony and 
availability of the witnesses; and 
(d) whether Defendant suffered any prejudice 
from the failure to produce the 
witnesses; and 
(3) was trial counsel ineffective for not filing 
a pretrial motion in limine to exclude 
Defendant's prior strong-arm robbery 
conviction, including: 
(a) the facts of the strong-arm 
robbery; 
(b) whether there was any strategic reason 
for not filing the motion; and 
(c) whether any prejudice resulted from the 
failure to file the motion. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial court shall "complete 
the proceedings on remand within 90 days of the issuance of 
th[is] order of remand." Utah R. App. P. 23B(c). 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84109-0419 
Telephone: (801)706-1114 
ATTORNEY FOR MR. HERNANDEZ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
S TATE OF UTAH, Findings of Fact and 
: Conclusions of Law 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, on 23 B Remand 
v. 
DOMINIQUE P. HERNANDEZ, Case No. 011918848 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. Judge William W. Barrett 
The Utah Court of Appeals remanded this matter to this Court for the entry of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on several issues. 
Having conducted a full evidentiary hearing and having reviewed the transcript of 
that hearing and the exhibits admitted therein, this Court hereby enters the following 
findings of fact regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the letter or business 
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cards of Hernandez's parole officer were visible outside the wallet while inside an 
evidence bag submitted to the jury. 
2. The plastic bag containing the wallet was opened during the deliberations. 
3. The stipulation entered into by the parties accurately reflects what the Court 
finds regarding the jurors' awareness of the contents of the wallet Specifically, 
a. Juror Michael Scown recalled seeing one business card in the 
plastic bag with the wallet and recalls that the business card was the card of 
a Wyoming parole officer. 
b. Juror Cheryl Dangerfield recalled that another juror 
commented to her that something in the wallet indicated that defendant was 
on parole. Ms. Dangerfield recalled that she did not personally see the item. 
c. Juror Rebecca Walther recalled seeing one business card in 
the bag with the wallet but did not recall what the business card was for. 
d. Jurors Julie McGow, Rafael Gonzalez, and Jose Lozano 
recalled seeing business cards but did not recall what they were for. 
e. Jurors James Morris and Bea Rigby recall seeing the wallet 
but do not recall seeing any business cards. 
f. Although jurors Cheryl Dangerfield and Rafael Gonzalez 
recall seeing somebody open the wallet, none of the jurors recall seeing 
anything related to defendant's parole other than as outlined above. 
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4. Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that Hernandez suffered no 
prejudice from trial counsel's admission of the wallet 
5. The facts of Hernandez' prior strong-arm robbery are as testified to by 
Hernandez on page 17 of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing: that he was with his 
brother in a car, that they pulled into a supermarket in need of gas money and other 
things, that Hernandez jumped out of a car and took a woman's purse from her, that 
Hernandez got back into the car, and that they used the money. 
6. Defendant's trial counsel did not ascertain the factual details of the strong-
arm robbery prior to the trial in this case. 
7. The trial prosecutor testified at the rule 23 B hearing that he had no 
intention whatsoever of introducing Hernandez's criminal record at trial, either as 
substantive or impeachment evidence, and was not prepared to do so. 
8. However, given that the prosecutor did not say anything when trial counsel 
asked the Court at the close of the State's case regarding the admissibility of the prior 
strong-armed robbery, this leaves a question in the Court's mind that the prosecutor might 
very well have wanted to bring in that strong-arm robbery conviction had Hernandez 
testified. 
9. Defendant's trial counsel had a strategic reason to wait to move to exclude 
the criminal history: he waits to see what is going to transpire during the course of trial 
before deciding whether a defendant's testimony will be required. 
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10. Hernandez was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to file a motion in 
limine seeking to exclude his strong arm robbery conviction prior to trial. 
11. Prior to trial, Hernandez informed trial counsel of relatives who could serve 
as alibi witnesses. 
12. While defendant's trial counsel may not have been told the specific names 
and contact information for Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla until after trial, trial 
counsel had enough information before trial to investigate these witnesses. 
13. Trial counsel made no efforts to locate and interview these witnesses until 
after trial. 
14. Amanda Hernandez would have come to the trial and testified as follows: 
a. That items 2 through 6 on page 7 of her telephone bill evidence five 
telephone calls to her from payphones in Washington and Utah between the period of 
December 1 and December 5, 2001, and that she believes that all those calls were from 
defendant. 
b. That items 23 through 27 on page 9 of her telephone bill evidence 
five additional telephone calls to her from Salt Lake City between the period of December 
3 and December 5, 2001, and that all those calls were probably from defendant. 
c. That she recalls sending defendant a Western Union money gram a 
few days prior to December 5, 2001, but did not know when she did so. 
d. That on December 5, 2001, she was on the telephone with defendant 
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from approximately 6:22 p.m. to 6:29 p.m., and that her telephone bill confirms this call. 
e. That, during that telephone call, defendant was trying to get home to 
Wyoming from Utah and was obtaining her permission to charge to Amanda Hernandez's 
phone bill a telephone call to his grandmother, Margaret Puebla. 
f. That her telephone bill reflects that defendant made a telephone call 
to Margaret Puebla on December 5, 2001, which began at 6:53 p.m. and lasted seven 
minutes. 
g. That she called Margaret Puebla at 6:55 p.m. to insure that defendant 
had reached Margaret Puebla. 
h. That Margaret Puebla was on the phone with defendant at that time. 
15. Margaret Puebla would have come to the trial and testified as follows: 
a. That on December 5, 2001, defendant called her asking for money to 
get home from Salt Lake. 
b. That after the telephone call, she wired him $45 through Western 
Union. 
16. Trial counsel's failure to pursue and call these witnesses causes the Court 
great concern. 
17. The preliminary hearing and trial transcripts demonstrate that the robbery 
was committed during a narrow period of time, and it may have made a significant 
difference if Amanda Hernandez, Margaret Puebla and the phone records had been 
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available for Mr. Hernandez's defense. 
18. Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were not alibi witnesses in the 
true sense of the word because their testimony would not have established that defendant 
was on the telephone with them at the same time the robbery was committed. 
19. However, Amanda Hernandez and Margaret Puebla were significant 
defense witnesses that would have given defendant a stronger defense than the defense he 
presented to the jury. 
20. Hernandez was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to investigate and call 
these witnesses. 
DATED this /i day of December, 2QQ3- T Y : v - , 
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DAVID P.S. MACK, #4370 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone Number: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. ] 
DOMINIQUE HERNANDEZ, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) Case No. 011918848 
) Judge Barrett 
DEFENDANT HERNANDEZ' PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, David P.S. Mack, and 
submits to the court the Defendant's Proffered Jury Instructions. 
Respectfully submitted to the Court and served the above instructions by hand delivery to 
Kenneth Updegrove, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County at 231 East 400 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this J_T day of A ° ^ j ^ ^ 2002. 
David P.S. Mack 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, 
are in favor of innocence. A defendant is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable 
doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is 
entitled to acquittal. 
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which 
is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is 
open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies 
your mind and convinces your conscientious understanding. 
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men 
and women and arises from the evidence, or lack of 
evidence, in the case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
One of the most important questions in this case is the 
identification of the defendant as the person who committed the 
crime. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt, not only that the crime was committed, but also 
that the defendant was the person who committed the crime. If, 
after considering the evidence you have heard from both sides, you 
are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
the person who committed the crime, you must find the defendant not 
guilty. 
The identification testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To find the 
defendant not guilty, you need not believe that the identification 
witness was insincere, but merely that the witness was mistaken in 
his/her belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of identification. In 
considering whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant is the person who committed the crime, you 
should consider the following: 
1. Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? In answering this question, you should 
consider: 
a) the length of time the witnesses observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible 
and undisguised; 
(cont.) 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
e) the presence or absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness' 
opportunity to observe the person committing the 
crime. 
2. Did the witnesses have the capacity to observe the 
person committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness7 capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of a 
different race than the criminal actor. Identification by a person 
of a different race may be less reliable than identification by a 
person of the same race. 
3. Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness knew that a crime was taking place during the time 
he/she observed the actor. Even if the witness had adequate 
opportunity and capacity to observe the criminal act, he/she may 
not have done so unless he/she was aware that a crime was being 
committed. 
(cont.) 
4. Was the witness' identification of the defendant 
completely the product of his own memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the witness' 
original observation and his identification of the 
defendant; 
b) the witness' capacity and state of mind at the time 
of the identification; 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions of 
identifications given by other witnesses, to photographs 
or newspaper accounts, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the independence of 
his/her identification; 
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, failed to identify the defendant; 
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, gave a description of the actor that is 
inconsistent with the defendant's appearance; 
f) the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. 
You may take into account that an identification made by 
picking the defendant from a group of similar individuals is 
generally more reliable than an identification made from the 
defendant being presented alone to the witness. 
You may also take into account that identifications made 
from seeing the person are generally more reliable than 
identification made from a photograph. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime is on the 
prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you have heard 
from the prosecution and from the defense, and after evaluating the 
(cont.) 
eyewitness testimony in light of the considerations listed above, 
you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is the 
person who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty. 
